Calvin K. Florence v. Dewayne Iverson, Bruce E. Holmes, Holmes Realty, a Utah Coporation, James R. Gaddis, Gaddis Investments, a Utah Corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Calvin K. Florence v. Dewayne Iverson, Bruce E.
Holmes, Holmes Realty, a Utah Coporation, James
R. Gaddis, Gaddis Investments, a Utah
Corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.; Attorney for Appellant.
Earl D. Tanner, Esq.; Brad L. Englund, Esq.; Tanner, Bowen & Tanner; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Florence v. Iverson, No. 860139.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/973
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
K H J 
5f; 
DOCKET NO. •ywyft-d 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN K. FLORENCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES, 
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation, 
JAMES R. GADDIS, GADDIS INVEST-
MENTS, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
No. 20813 
8bO(*fl-CA 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
Earl D. Tanner, Esq. 
Brad L Englund, Esq. 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
fiiEPSS fccmrj 
°£C101385 
•«•
 CUPREME COURT 
CALVIN K. F : 
Plaint itf-Appellant, 
vs. 
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES, Supreme Court 
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation, No. ?nRn 
JAMES !<. GADDIS, GADDIS INVEST- : 
MENTS, - Tt-=K Corporation, 
Defendants-Responden 
RESPONDED i M*.)'.F 
Appeal from the .. * ,,^,, . .^  ... -: - - *• 'Hirt 
of Salt Lake County 
Honorable Dea* Conde 
TANNER, "•••"'"WEN & TANNER 
£ar] * Tanner, Esq. 
DLCIU . Englund, Esq. 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City •• -l 
Attorneys f >r Respondent 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq, 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utc 
VI I i wuy toi Appo 1 1 an I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Statement of Facts. . . . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The Summary Judgment dismissing 
Appellant's cause against Respondent 
should be affirmed because Appellant's 
own testimony shows that the alleged 
contract is either unenforceable or 
lacks the consent of a necessary party... 
POINT II. The Summary Judgment dismissing 
Appellant's cause against Respondent 
should be affirmed because Appellant's 
own testimony shows that he does not 
qualify to benefit under the alleged 
implied agreementf and because the 
law of the case heretofore decided 
bars recovery under the implied 
agreement alleged. 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 
(1961) 9 
Miller v. Miller, 664 P. 2d 39 (Wyo. 1983) 10 
Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417, 529 P.2d 1289 
(1974) 9 
Rules 
Rule 2(g), Rules of Practice in the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah..... 7 
Rule 2(h), Rules of Practice in the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah 7,12 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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vs. : 
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES, : Supreme Court 
HOLMES REALTY, a Utah Corporation, No. 20813 
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MENTS, a Utah Corporation, 
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact 
which would preclude summary judgment. 
2. Whether the alleged oral contract is enforceable. 
3. Whether the alleged implied agreement is 
enforceable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This case is a suit on a 
certain alleged oral and/or implied contract among licensed real 
estate brokers and salesmen. Calvin Florence ("Florence") 
claimed the said contract was made with DeWayne Iverson 
("Iverson"), Bruce Holmes, Holmes Realty, James Gaddis, and 
Gaddis Investments ("Gaddis"). On September 27, 1984, Florence 
brought suit against the above-named parties for breach of the 
alleged contract. (R 1.) Gaddis brought a motion for summary 
judgment which was granted on March 21f 1985f dismissing the 
action against Gaddis with prejudice for the reason that the 
deposition of Florence established that Gaddis had no contract of 
any kind with Gaddis, oral or implied, to share future fees with 
Florence. (R 30, 51.) Florence did not appeal that judgment. 
Iverson then brought a similar motion for summary judgment which 
was granted on June 27, 1985 dismissing the action against 
Iverson with prejudice. (R 84.) It is this ruling from which 
Florence appeals. Florence filed his Notice of Appeal on July 
27, 1985, while the claims against defendants Holmes and Holmes 
Realty were still pending. (R 87.) On October 30, 1985, 
Florence moved to dismiss his Complaint against Holmes and Holmes 
Realty, and that motion was granted on the same day. 
2. Statement of Facts. This suit arises out of an 
abortive attempt to sell the Karen Lee Apartments which took 
place during the late Summer and Fall of 1983. The record shows 
that on or about August 23, 1983, Gaddis contacted Florence and 
asked if he knew of any apartment complexes which were for sale. 
(R 89, Deposition of Calvin Florence, 12/13/84, p.8 [hereinafter 
"Depo."].) Florence responded that he did not have one himself, 
but knew of one that may be for sale. (R 89; Depo., p.8.) 
Thereafter, Florence contacted Iverson and told him that Gaddis 
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wanted information on the Karen Lee apartments, a complex on 
which Iverson previously had a listing. (R 89, Depo., pp. 9, 
10.) Iverson was unwilling to release the information without a 
written agreement respecting sharing of fees. 
Iverson requested that Florence obtain a letter 
from Gaddis setting out in a legally binding written form the 
terms of the commission split among the three brokers. (R 89, 
Depo., p. 10.) Florence stated, "I will contact Gaddis and have 
him write the letter and get it to you this afternoon and then 
you can give him the information [on the Karen Lee]." )R 89, 
Depo., p. 10.) After receiving the requested letter from Gaddis, 
Florence took it to Iverson's office and delivered it to him. 
Upon receipt of the letter, Iverson delivered to Florence the 
information on the Karen Lee Apartments. (R 89, Depo., pp. 
12-13.) Florence alleges and testified in his deposition that he 
thereafter requested and obtained from Iverson an oral assurance 
that if Iverson knew of any other property, that the commission 
arrangement would remain the same should Gaddis1 clients purchase 
the other property. (R 89, Depo., pp.14-15.) 
The Karen Lee Apartments were not purchased by 
Gaddis1 clients. Several months later Gaddis and Iverson 
participated as real estate agents in arranging a sale of the 
Brittany Apartments, a different property from the Karen Lee. (R 
89, Depo., p. 16.) Florence claims to be owed a one-third share 
of the commission for the sale of the Brittany Apartments. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Florence's Complaint alleges two causes of action 
against defendants. The first cause of action seeks enforcement 
of an alleged oral contract which Flornce contends was made 
between himself and Iverson. The second cause of action seeks 
enforcement of an alleged implied agreement among the parties 
based on a custom and practice in the community. 
Florence's claim that he had an oral contract must fail 
for two reasons: First, the alleged promise of Iverson, if given 
at all, was given without consideration and therefore is 
unenforceable. Second, no agreement was obtained from Gaddisf a 
necessary party to formation of the alleged contract for a 
three-way sharing of fees. 
Florence contends that he received a promise from 
Iverson to apply the terms of a written contract to certain 
future transactions. The contract provides for a three-way split 
of any commission earned on the sale of the Karen Lee Apartments. 
Florence was to receive a portion of the commission because of 
his bringing Gaddis and Iverson together on the proposed sale. 
Florence contends that this contract was extended by Iverson to 
include any commission earned on the sale of any other apartments 
which involved Iverson, Gaddis, and the persons who were the 
clients of Gaddis at the time the written contract was made. The 
alleged promise by Iverson was given after Florence had performed 
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his duties under the written contract. In eliciting the alleged 
promise, Florence did not suffer further legal detriment or do or 
promise or undertake to do anything. The alleged promise was 
given without consideration. Accordingly, even if the promise 
had been givenf it is unenforceable for lack of consideration. 
Further, the written contractf which Florence contends 
was extended by the alleged promise of Iverson, provides that 
Gaddis will split among the three parties any commission Gaddis 
receives on the said transaction. In order for such an agreement 
to come into existencef Gaddis' consent is required. Gaddis* 
consent was necessary as it was Gaddis, not Iverson, who would 
receive the commission check and would have to be bound to share 
it if the alleged contract were to come into existence. Florence 
testified that Gaddis did not consent to the alleged extension. 
As Iverson made no legally binding promise to share any 
commission he received from Gaddis, and as Gaddis did not agree 
to share his commission on any sale except a sale of the Karen 
Lee Apartmentsf Florence's claim to the benefit of the claimed 
contract must fail. 
Florence's claim that he is entitled to share the 
Brittany commission on the basis of an implied contract must also 
fail for two reasons: First, Florence does not qualify to 
benefit under the implied contract he alleges to exist. Second, 
the lower Court's decision dismissing Florence's action against 
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Gaddis set the law of the case and Iverson cannot be charged uner 
an agreement to share a Gaddis commission when Gaddis has already 
been freed from any obligation to share that very same 
commission. The lower Court's decision granting judgment in 
favor of Gaddis applies with equal force to Florence's claim 
against Iverson and precludes judgment against Iverson alone* 
Florence testified that the alleged custom or trade 
practice which he claimed to give rise to the implied agreement 
was the legal consequence of the participation of more than one 
broker* It is uncontested that Florence did not participate in 
any fashion in the sale of the Brittany Apartments. Therefore, 
even if there were a custom and trade practice which created an 
implied agreement in case of multiple broker participation, by 
his own statement Florence does not qualify to participate in any 
fee arising from the Brittany sale. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's 
cause against Respondent should be affirmed 
because Appellant's own testimony shows that 
the alleged contract is either unenforceable 
or lacks the consent of a necessary party. 
For purposes of this appeal the facts are assumed to be 
those set out by Florence in his deposition. They show that the 
alleged oral contract between Florence and Iverson is 
unenforceable for two reasons: Firstr the alleged contract, 
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whether oral or implied, lacks consideration; and second, the 
alleged contract, whether oral or implied, lacks the agreement of 
Gaddis, who is a necessary party to the formation of the alleged 
contract. 
A. The alleged oral contract is unenforceable because 
of a lack of consideration. 
Rule 2(g), Rules of Practice in the Third Judicial 
District Court, requires that the points and authorities in 
support of a dispositive motion begin with separately numbered 
statements of material facts as to which the movant contends no 
genuine issue of fact exists. Under Section (h) of this rule, 
all material facts set forth in the statement of movant are 
deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party. 
In the present case, the affidavit of Fallentine, and the 
memorandum to which it was attached, were not timely filed and 
for that reason the Court declined to consider either. (R 84.) 
Therefore, the statements of facts in Iverson's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment were not specifically 
controverted and are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion. 
Florence's claim to an oral contract arises out of 
an alleged extension of a written contract. The written 
contract, attached hereto as Appendix MAW (R 89, Depo., Exhibit 
1), provides that Gaddis agrees to split any commission earned 
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with Florence and Iverson [the other party] on the sale of the 
Karen Lee Apartments [the 120-unit complex in Granger]• The 
written contract was a result of conversations between Gaddis and 
Florence, and between Florence and Iverson. In August, 1983, 
Gaddis approached Florence and asked if he had information on 
apartment complexes for sale. Florence responded that he had no 
clients with such property, but knew someone who did. To which 
Gaddis said, MGet me the information on it. I need it fast." 
Thereafter, Florence contacted Iverson, who requested that 
Florence obtain from Gaddis a written agreement to split the 
commission if the apartment was sold. Florence promised to get 
the agreement, and Iverson promised to give the information on 
the property. 
After Florence had obtained the written agreement 
and after Iverson had given Florence the information on the 
property, Florence alleges he obtained a promise from Iverson 
that should Gaddis' clients purchase any other property that 
Iverson knew of, the commission arrangement would remain the 
same. (R 62-63.) It is on this alleged promise that Florence 
bases his claim for an oral contract. (R 61-62.) 
Florence's claim of an oral contract must fail for 
lack of consideration. Viewed in its most generous light, the 
alleged oral promise is nothing more than an effort to broaden by 
parol evidence and without any new or additional consideration, 
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the scope of the written contract. The written contract provided 
that Florence was to receive from Gaddis a one-third portion of 
any commission Gaddis received from the sale of the Karen Lee. 
The consideration for this covenant was his bringing Gaddis and 
Iverson together on the transaction. Florence was to perform no 
other duty under the contract. 
At a time when he had fully performed his duty 
under the written contract, having brought Gaddis and Iverson 
together, Florence, under the most favorable interpretation of 
his testimony, simply asked for and obtained Iverson's 
acquiescence that the written contract be extended beyond its 
written terms and provide that Florence receive further 
compensation for his having done that which he was required to do 
by the terms of the written agreement. 
Under the alleged oral contract, Florence did not 
undertake any new duties, did not bind himself to new or 
additional promises, and did not incur any detriment. Under any 
definition of consideration, Florence's narrative is devoid of 
anything which would even suggest that he gave any consideration 
in exchange for the promise he claims Iverson to have made 
respecting future transactions. 
It is a universal rule of contract law that a 
promise received without consideration is unenforceable. Manwill 
v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961); Vance v. Connell, 
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96 Idaho 417, 529 P.2d 1289 (1974); Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39 
(Wyo. 1983). Therefore, even if the alleged promise to keep the 
commission arrangement the same on the sale of other property had 
been given, it is unenforceable for lack of consideration. 
Iverson is entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law because the alleged promise is unenforceable. 
B. The absence of agreement by Gaddis to the alleged 
oral contract is fatal to the formation of the claimed contract. 
Iverson is further entitled to summary judgment 
because the language of the alleged promise to Florence purports 
to set up a tri-lateral agreement, and the agreement of Gaddis, 
the third essential party was never obtained. Florence does not 
contend that Gaddis ever agreed, orally or otherwise, to share 
future commissions with Florence. 
Florence testified that Iverson agreed to his 
statement that "the commission arrangement will remain the same 
on this one or any other property that Gaddis' buyers buy." 
(R 89, Depo., p.10.) It is upon this that Florence bases his 
claim that a binding contract had been formed. (R 61-62.) This 
is insufficient to create a binding contract to share a future, 
unidentified and unidentifiable commission among the three 
persons because Gaddis, the person who agreed to share his Karen 
Lee commission, is not even claimed to have given his consent to 
the agreement. Indeed, there is nothing to suggest that he was 
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aware of the claim that there was a commitment respecting future 
commissions. 
The written contract, upon which the alleged oral 
contract is based, provided that Gaddis agreed to split any 
commission earned between the three parties. See Appendix "A." 
There was no agreement under the written contract that Iverson 
would split any fee he received from Gaddis, nor was there an 
agreement by Iverson that if Gaddis did not pay part of the 
commissions to Florence, Iverson would pay a portion of what he 
received to Florence. Therefore, Florence has no cause of action 
against Iverson. 
Florence testified that the oral contract provided 
that the commission arrangement would remain the same on any 
subsequent sales. As Gaddis was the realtor who would receive 
the commission check on the sale, it would be necessary to obtain 
his agreement if a new contract or change to the existing 
contract were to arise. In granting Gaddis' motion for summary 
judgment, this Court necessarily ruled that there was no contract 
between Florence and Gaddis respecting the later sale. If Gaddis 
is not bound, the contract is incomplete at best and Iverson 
cannot be bound. It follows that no new or modified contract has 
arisen among the parties to the first agreement. 
C. There are no genuine issues of material fact with 
respect to the alleged oral contract. 
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In his Brief, Florence states that a material 
factual dispute exists as to whether the alleged promise was made 
before or after he had completed his duties under the written 
agreement. In so contending, Florence points out a discrepancy 
in the dates set forth that the alleged conversation was to have 
taken place. The question is whether it took place on the 25th 
or 26th of August. This question of fact, however, is 
immaterial. Florence has admitted that the conversation in which 
the alleged promise was given took place after he had delivered 
Iverson the written agreement and Iverson had delivered to 
Florence the information on the Karen Lee Apartments. (R 62-63, 
para. 5.) Therefore, whether the conversation took place on the 
25th or 26th does not change the fact that Florence gave no 
consideration to Iverson for the alleged promise, nor does it 
change the fact that a necessary party to the alleged contract 
does not consent to an extension to the original contract. 
Florence also argues that summary judgment is 
precluded because the facts necessary to establish a lack of 
consideration were not conclusively established in the record. 
However, because of Rule 2(h), Rules of Practice in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the necessary facts are deemed admitted. 
Taking the facts in a light most favorable to 
Florence, Iverson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of 
an oral contract. 
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POINT II 
The Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant1s 
cause against Respondent should be affirmed 
because Appellant's own testimony shows that 
he does not qualify to benefit under the 
alleged implied agreement, and because the law 
of the case heretofore decided bars recovery 
under the implied agreement alleged. 
In his Complaint, Florence claimed a right to a split 
of commissions on the sale of the Brittany Apartments based on an 
"implied agreement arising from the custom and trade practices in 
the real estate brokerage profession to divide fees equally when 
more than one broker is involved in a real estate sales project." 
(R 1.) Iverson is entitled to summary judgment on this 
contention for two reasons: First, Florence does not qualify as a 
party to an implied agreement based on custom and trade practice; 
and second, the law of the case was either that no implied 
agreement exists or that Florence did not qualify as a party to 
an implied agreement* 
A. Florence does not qualify as a party to any implied 
agreement• 
In his deposition, Florence defined the custom and 
trade practice relied upon in his Complaint, which created the 
alleged implied agreement, as a practice of splitting commissions 
"based upon the participation of the brokers..." (R 89, Depo., 
pp. 41-42.) Therefore, in order to recover under an implied 
agreement, Florence would have had to have participated in the 
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sale of the Brittany Apartments. It is uncontested that Florence 
did no work with respect to the sale of the Brittany Apartments 
(R. 63/ para. 6.); he did not participate in any manner. Under 
the terms of his definition, Florence could not benefit from the 
alleged implied agreement since he did notf by his own testimony, 
participate in transactions from which he claims a commission. 
(R 89, Depo., p. 46.). Therefore, he is not entitled to recover 
under his theory of implied agreement based on custom or trade 
practice. 
B. The law of the case is that Florence is not 
entitled to recover on the basis of an implied agreement. 
Iverson is entitled to summary judgment on the 
claim for recovery under the theory of implied agreement because 
he stands in no different position than Gaddis in relation to 
Florence, insofar as the claimed implied agreement is concerned. 
(R 84, Depo., pp. 41-44.) In ruling on Gaddis' motion for 
summary judgment, the Court below necessarily concluded that 
Florence was not entitled to recover on his theory of implied 
agreement for either one of two reasons: Either because there was 
no custom or trade practice which would create such an agreement, 
or because Florence did not qualify as a party to the agreement. 
Florence has not appealed the summary judgment dismissing the 
action against Gaddis with prejudice. This became the law of the 
case and Iverson cannot be charged under an agreement to share a 
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Gaddis commission when Gaddis has already been freed from any 
obligation to share that very same commission. It would follow 
that the lower Court's decision granting judgment in favor of 
Gaddis applies with equal force to Florence's claim against 
Iverson and precludes judgment against Iverson. 
C. There are no genuine issues of material fact with 
respect to the alleged implied contract. 
In his Brief, Florence states that there is an 
issue of fact as to the existence of a custom or trade practice 
to divide fees. This issue, it is contended, was raised by an 
affidavit of Bernard C. Fallentine which stated that there was a 
custom to divide commissions. However, this affidavit was not 
before the Court. In granting Iverson's motion for summary 
judgment, the affidavit was excluded from consideration as it was 
not timely filed. (R. 74, 84, 86.) Therefore, the affidavit 
cannot be used to raise an issue of material fact. Had the 
Fallentine affidavit been before the Court, it would still follow 
that a practice which did not bind Gaddis to split the commission 
he received on the sale could not bind Iverson to a tri-partite 
implied agreement• 
Even should this Court determine that an issue of 
fact exists as to existence of a custom or trade practice, the 
issue would not be material because any trade practice is based 
on participation, and it is undisputed that Florence did not 
participate in any way in the subject transaction, the sale of 
the Brittany Apartments. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists which if decided in favor of Florence would preclude 
summary judgment with regard to the alleged oral contract; it is 
uncontested that Florence gave no new consideration for the 
subsequent promise, and there is no claim by Florence that the 
necessary third party to the agreement consented to share any 
future commission. With regard to the alleged implied agreement, 
granting of summary judgment to Gaddis precludes judgment for 
Florence against Iverson on that point. Florence did not 
participate in the sale of the apartments, which participation 
is, by his own statement, a condition precedent to recovery under 
the implied agreement alleged. 
The summary judgment dismissing the claim against 
Iverson should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of December, 1985. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of December, 
1985, a true and correct copy of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was served on 
the Appellant by hand delivering a copy thereof to: 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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GADDIS 
INVESTMENTS 
August 25t 1983 
Cal Florence 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Cal: 
This letter will confirm our agreement that I agree to 
split any commission earned,regarding the sale of 
approximately 120 unit complex in Granger, three ways— 
Gaddis Investment, yourself, and the other party. 
Maximum commission will be 1*5%. 
(T. C tfV-5'7^) 
1
 * 
APPENDIX "A" 
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